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CPLR 5231: Personal Property Law Section 49-b limits income
execution.
Under CPLR 5231, virtually any income over thirty dollars
per week may be made subject to continuing execution up to ten
per cent thereof. Section 49-b of the Personal Property Law,
however, provides that an assignment or court order for the support
of the employee's minor children or spouse "takes priority over
any other assignment or garnishment of wages, salary and/or com-
missions .. ." I6 The amount of this support payment is not
limited to any percentile deduction as is execution under CPLR
5231. The extent to which this priority of support-order deductions
affects income execution pursuant to CPLR 5231 has been the
subject of judicial consideration.
In the case of Loan Serv. Corp. v. Bridgeport Lumber Co.,1 67
the court, in consonance with the New York Attorney General,16s
held that the "priority" provision of section 49-b could not have
been intended by the legislature to ,exclude all other garnishments while
the support order was in effect. The court emphasized that to so
construe the section would render the employee's wages immune
from garnishment for an indeterminate period, and thereby create
an opportunity for collusion between spouses to feign separation
and defeat judgment creditors. It therefore concluded that the
priority of support-order deductions did not prevent a simultaneous
garnishment (income execution) or wage assignment of an em-
ployee's salary.
In Feder v. Sky way Container Corp.,169 the court, after con-
siderable analysis of the interaction of the sections involved, held
the legislative intent behind section 49-b to be that "an order for
the support of children shall always come first, and the payment
of other debts second." 170
The recent case of Beahm v. Beahm 17 L adopted the Feder
position and, in fact, amplified it by holding that the priority of
support orders under section 49-b required that even prior income
executions, already in effect on the employee's salary, be suspended
prima facie until the support deduction had been eliminated.172 The
Beahm court explained that this prima facie suspension did not
165 See CPLR 5231(b).
166N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAW §49-b(2).
16727 Misc. 2d 938, 939, 215 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County), ard uvithout opinion, 14 App. Div. 2d 827, 218 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th
Dep't 1961).
163 See 1959 Ops. N.Y. A-rs'y Gsx. 103, 104.
169218 N.Y.S.2d 362 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1961).
27 0 Id. at 368.
17147 Misc. 2d 900, 263 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y.C. Fam. Ct. 1965).
'
72 Id. at 902-03, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
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render the employee's income immune from any further continuing
levy, but rather put the burden upon the judgment creditor to
take affirmative steps under the CPLR's several provisions allowing
the continuing levy on income not necessary for the reasonable
requirements of the employee and his dependents.1 7 3  The court in
Beahm justified placing the burden upon the judgment creditor by
the fact that the economic situation of typical garnished judgment
debtors puts such formal legal remedies beyond their means. 7 4  The
opinion indicated that, whatever tightening of credit would result,
its holding was sanctioned by the overriding intent of the legislature
to insure dependent support and to relieve the welfare rolls of this
significant burden . 7
Beahm's interpretation of the language of section 49-b appears
to have merit. The word "priority" when used elsewhere in the
CPLR results in the prior deduction from the employee's income
pre-empting any subsequent garnishment.7' Furthermore, Beahm's
holding is consistent with the implicit policy of the legislature to
limit compulsory deductions from a judgment debtor's income to
ten per cent unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines
that he is receiving additional sums which are unnecessary for the
reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his depen-
dents.' 7  If income execution and support-order deductions were
allowed to operate simultaneously, the employee's income would
be subject to total deductions greatly in excess of ten per cent
without judicial determination. For example, a judgment debtor
earning ninety dollars per week might ordinarily be required to
pay thirty-five dollars for support of his wife and children. An
additional nine dollar garnishment might destroy his incentive to
continue working and thereby place the entire burden of support
upon the welfare department. It would also seem that the legisla-
tive intent to minimize welfare costs supports an extension of the
priority of these support-order deductions even to the suspension
of prior (in time) income executions. 78
Judgment creditors who rely upon income execution to satisfy
their judgments must be forewarned that this source of recovery
may be denied them when a support-order deduction takes effect
'7 See CPLR 5226, 5231(g), 5240. See also CPLR 5205(e). In addition,
note the court's discussion of how, on its own motion, it could stay the
operation of Personal Property Law Section 49-b and permit simultaneous
income execution and support order deductions. See Beahm v. Beahm, 47 Misc.
2d 900, 911, 263 N.Y.S.2d 533, 543 (N.Y.C. Faro. Ct. 1965).
1 4 Beahm v. Beahm, supra note 173, at 907, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
1 7Id. at 902, 909, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 535, 541-42.
176"CPLR 5231(h). See also N.Y. PsRs. PROP. LAW § 48-a.
177See CPLR sections cited in note 173 supra.
17 See Wylegala, Memorandum of Committee on Legislation of Nezv York
State Association of Children's Court .T-dges, 1958 N.Y. LEGis. A xuAL 6.
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on a judgment debtor's income source. In addition, those who
deal with persons having few assets aside from their earning
power are advised to evaluate their credit policies in view of the
Beahmr decision.
CPLR 5231(b).: Drawing accounts subject to income execution.
Judgment debtors, who work on commission or percentage
bases and are paid principally by means of a drawing account
charged against future commissions, provide considerable diffi-
culties whenever their earnings are subjected to income execution.
A drawing account is an arrangement whereby the employer agrees
to advance to his employee a certain sum, usually weekly, against
commissions to be earned. The employee agrees to repay that
part of the sums advanced which is in excess of his commissions
subsequently earned . 7  The cause of the difficulty is that the
employer, by advancing sums sufficient to exceed the employee's
accrued commissions, can consistently avoid being the holder of
any money due the employee."s The income execution sections
of both the CPLR and the CPA were designed to reach only
moneys due the judgment debtor from the garnishee (employer).s'1
Therefore, the judgment debtor, under such a drawing account
arrangement and with the cooperation of his employer, could
substantially immunize himself from income execution under
CPLR 5231.
In Larry Goldwater, Inc. v. C. B. Snyder Nat'l Realty Ca.,8 2
the Civil Court of New York City was faced with the possibility
of a salesman on commission avoiding income execution under
CPLR 5231(b). Defendant employer made the orthodox argu-
ment that deduction need only be made from sums due and owing
the judgment debtor and, that the advances always exceeded the
earnings. The Goldwater court passed unhindered through the
70We do not concern ourselves here with agreements by which the em-
ployer advances moneys without any obligation on the employee's part to
repay, which are merely advance wage payments and dearly subject to execu-
tion under CPLR 5231. See Laird v. Carton, 196 N.Y. 169, 175, 89 N.E. 822,
824 (1909).
180 See Franklin Simon & Co. v. Pease Elliman, Inc., 238 App. Div. 614,
616, 255 N.Y. Supp. 199, 201 (1st Dep't), notion for leave to appeal denied,
262 N.Y. 693, 188 N.E. 124 (19333.
'8'CPA §684(7) provided that compensation through such a drawing
account should be treated as wages. And under CPA § 684(1) any wages
"due and owing to the judgment debtor" were-subject, to the extent of ten
per cent; to garnishment for the benefit of the judgment creditor. CPLR 5231
(b) & (e) provide that "where a judgment debtor is receiving or will
receive" more than thirty dollars from a person, such person upon his service
with an income execution shall withhold, under CPLR 5231(e), "from money
then or thereafter due to the judgment debtor" installments of ten per cent.182 48 Misc. 2d 669, 265 N.Y.S.2d 542 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct 1965).
